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CENTRALIZATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE POLICE
GEORGE E. BERKLEY
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Boston, Massachusetts. Dr. Berkley is author of The Democratic Policeman (Beacon Press, 1969),
and two articles dealing with European police problems. He received his Ph.D. from Tufts University
in 1969 and had previously served as a Professor of Political Science at Albion College, and as a
Press Secretary to Governor Peabody of Massachusetts, 1962-1963, and Mayor Collins of Boston,
1960. His present article is based upon material contained in his book, The Democratic Policeman.
-EDITOR.
Prescriptions for creating a democratic police
force may vary, but one element they usually
emphasize is decentralization. A centralized police,
it is often argued, is not only inconsistent with, but
actually a threat to, democratic government. A
large and disciplined force of armed men, it is con-
tended, may lead to a swallowing up of democratic
institutions. At the very least, a centralized police
force tends to become too remote and too insensi-
tive to the communities it serves.
Frequently cited as an example of the congru-
ence between police centralization and totalitari-
anism is the unification of the German police under
the Nazi regime. Today, one may point to the
Guardia Civil of Franco Spain as well as to the
police forces of many communist nations as existing
examples.
Yet, if police centralization seems to have char-
acterized many totalitarian regimes, it is increas-
ingly characterizing democratic ones as well. Such
developed democracies as Denmark, Belgium, and
Israel have long had national police forces. In 1965,
Sweden joined them by nationalizing its police. A
year later, the French parliament approved the
merger of the Paris police and the SurgMt Natitoale
into one country-wide constabulary force.
Other countries which have so far stopped short
of complete nationalization seem to be moving in
that direction. The three German states which still
have municipal police forces are gradually abolish-
ing them. England is consolidating its police forces
into fifty large units through a compulsory amal-
gamation scheme ordered by the Home Office.
The Home Secretary, it should be noted, already
wields considerable power over local police forces.
He issues rules and regulations governing police
standards and must approve the appointment of,
and can require the removal of, any local police
chief. If police centralization is inconsistent with
democracy, then many democracies do not seem
to have received the message.
This growing trend toward police centralization
provides a timely occasion to re-examine the whole
subject. Do centralized police forces threaten de-
mocracy or do they protect it? Does police cen-
tralization stifle democratic values and institutions
or does it foster their fulfillment?
A good starting place for finding answers to
these questions is that classic work of American
political thought-it may be the most significant
bit of political theory ever produced by an Ameri-
can-Federalist Paper Number 10. The Federalist
Papers, it should be remembered, were a plea and
a rationale for greater, not less, governmental
centralization, and in Number 10, the most note-
worthy of that impressive series, James Madison
argues persuasively to this end. Madison's case is
complex and is certainly not free of self-interest.
He was greatly concerned with protecting the
property of the privileged minority against usurpa-
tion by the unpropertied or little-propertied classes.
However, the thrust of his exegesis bears directly
on the entire problem of centralized government,
including the police function.
Madison maintains that conflicting interest, or
"faction," as he called it, can destroy a republic.
This results from the tendency of one faction to
get the upper hand over, and tyrannize over, an-
other faction. As a solution, he advocates enlarging
the area over which government rules. This brings
many more different factions under its scope and
thus makes it more difficult for any one particular
faction to dominate. Looked at from another di-
rection, the multiplicity of factions which result
from an expanded governmental sphere tend to
cancel each other out. This leaves the government
free, and almost compelled, to seek the common
denominator among the numerous groups and in-
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terests which jockey for its favor. In so doing, it
reaches out more fully for, and tends to serve bet-
ter, the public interest.
Much work has been done by political scientists
in recent years that lends credence to Madison's
thesis. Large cities with numerous and diverse
interest groups tend to be less dominated by any
one group than do small towns. Senators serving
large constituencies often seem more responsive
to the desires of the general public than do their
smaller-constituency colleagues in the House. And
the President, with the largest constituency of all,
remains the least susceptible to pressures from any
one particular interest and the most responsive to
the general welfare, at least as he perceives it.
This thesis has many implications for the police.
If small government tends to be less responsive to
the general will and more responsive to dominant
interest groups, than is large government, the same
will hold true for the police. That this has been and
is the case is borne out by the experience of many
nations. One reason the Germans give for doing
away with municipal police forces is the inability
of such forces to be independent of undue pres-
sures exerted by local influentials. The same holds
true for Great Britain. Before the Home Secretary
began asserting increasing control over British
police forces, constables could be seen washing the
cars of town and borough councilors. In this coun-
try, the pattern of police subservience to local
elites is widespread and deeply rooted.
Such practices are, of course, far from consistent
with democratic behavior as it is commonly under-
stood. If democracy is defined as "self-respect for
everybody," as Professor William Riker has de-
fined it, or as an "emphasis on human dignity,"
as Adlai Stevenson defined it, then equality before
the law and its agents is a sine qua non component.
Discriminatory treatment of any kind flouts
democracy's basic principles, and such treatment
has always characterized totalitarian regimes much
more extensively than it has democratic ones.
Centralization furthers the goal of equal and
impartial treatment in still other ways. The larger
an organization is, the more it will tend to stand-
ardize and formalize its methods and procedures.
In so doing, it will tend to curtail the opportunities
for arbitrary behavior on the part of its members.
The standardization and formalization of rules and
procedures compels the members of an organiza-
tion to treat both clients and colleagues, including
subordinates, in a more impersonal manner. The
discretionary area permitting the exercise of
favoritism or discrimination becomes correspond-
ingly reduced. As Professor Grant McConnel has
pointed out, "impersonality is the guarantee of in-
dividual freedom characteristic of the large unit."
Another democratizing factor facilitated by
centralization is job mobility. Larger organizations
provide more room for their members to move
around in than do smaller ones. The policeman of a
larger force who finds himself in a position that is
not of his liking has a much greater potential
opportunity to make a change. This will tend to
extend his own freedom and develop his own self-
respect while at the same time curbing the ability
of his immediate superiors to exercise undue au-
thority over him.
Job mobility adds another democratizing ele-
ment to a police organization, one that is somewhat
more subtle but one that, at the same time, may
be more important. Job mobility tends to churn
the membership of an organization, interjecting
from time to time new members into the organiza-
tion's sub-units. In so doing, it may reduce the
solidarity and sense of apartness in these sub-units
and thereby tend to make the police force less of a
"state within a state."
In his landmark work The Governmental Process,
Professor David Truman has stressed the need for
"Ccross pressures" to make a democratic society
viable. The fact that its members are frequently
pressured from different and sometimes conflicting
interests helps to keep them from extremism and
equips them with a basis for tolerating other points
of view. Job mobility may help to increase these
cross pressures within a police organization by
opening up its members to greater contact with
fellow employees of different backgrounds and
viewpoints.
There are yet additional benefits which cen-
tralization may yield in terms of police democra-
tization. To the extent that such centralization
leads to an increase in organizational size, it will
also tend to make the police force more attractive
to trade union organizers and to make trade
unionism more attractive to the policemen. This
can help democratize the police force in many ways.
For one thing, the trade union may interpose a
barrier between the police and an executive power
intent on using them to increase its own power.
During the stormy days of the Algerian crisis in
France, the unions helped thwart attempts by
right-wing elements in the upper police hieraichy
to make the police serve as a tool of extremism.
Trade unionism also gives the policeman opporLuni-
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ties to take part in such democratic processes as the
election of officers and the ratification of decisions.
It opens up avenues for the ventilation of griev-
ances and for participation in decision-making.
Trade unionism gives policemen spokesmen and
publications of their own. These can increase
society's knowledge of its police while, at the same
time, providing society with points of access for
reaching the police. Finally, trade unionism gives
the policeman some identification with the trade
union movement generally. This may curb the pull
to the right which the police, as symbols of au-
thority and defenders of law and property, nearly
always experience.
Most West European policemen belong to trade
unions and these organizations have helped ease
the problems which so easily arise between police
and society in a democracy. In all these countries,
police union leaders have insisted that the police
remain a thoroughly civilian body--after all,
more militarism would lessen the union's power--
and they have fought for such things as increased
recruit education, reduced reliance on force, and
improved public-police relations. They also help
prevent executive authorities from showing
favoritism or discrimination in their personnel
policies.
There are numerous other benefits which cen-
tralization, and its concomitant feature of large-
scale organization, may provide. The larger the
police force, the better able it will be to establish
extensive educational facilities and teaching staffs.
Various behavioral studies show that acceptance
of democratic norms and values tends to rise with
increased education. Large organizational size also
increases opportunities for specialization and this
permits increased use of civilian personnel. The
more civilians in a police force, the more the force
will take on the features of civil society. Further-
more, the increased specialization, along with the
increased resources which are made available by
increased organizational size, permit the police to
undertake more positive programs in crime pre-
vention, community relations, public relations,
etc. Sweden's activities in all these respects were
greatly accelerated by nationalization.
Last but certainly not least among the democra-
tizing elements which centralization may further
and foster is control. Although a local police would
seem much more controllable than a national one,
in practice it often works the other way. In Eu-
rope, parliaments have proven much more vigorous
in exercising police oversight than have municipal
councils. This was certainly the case in Germany
and is today the case in Great Britain. Israel, in-
terestingly enough, made the desire for increased
control a reason for setting up its police on a na
tional basis.
"The main advantage," writes a retired British
police superintendent of the Israeli national police,
"is that there is a parliamentary control over the
police, exercised through a minister which, on one
hand, places the force under the democratic control
of the nation, whilst, on the other hand, safeguards
it from subjection to purely local political influences
and pressures. It also insures the civil service char-
acter of the police and its complete abstention from
politics."
If a centralized police may lend itself to greater,
rather than lesser, control, then police centraliza-
tion should not pose a threat to democratic govern-
ment. The empirical evidence indicates that this is
the case. History shows no instance where the police
have taken over, or have decisively affected the
take-over, of a democratic regime. On the con-
trary, there is at least one instance where the lack
of centralization may have helped to bring about a
democracy's downfall.
The police of Germany's fragile Weimar Re-
public were not a centralized force. As a result, the
authorities often lacked the resources to deal with
the growing disorders and brawls which were dis-
gusting and frightening many Germans. As the
Nazi movement grew in power, it became more
difficult for local police chiefs-most of whom were
not Nazis themselves-to deal with Nazi hooli-
ganism. When Nazis posted their flags on a bridge
in Cologne in defiance of the law, Konrad Ade-
nauer, who was then the city's mayor, ordered the
local police to pull them down. His order went un-
heeded. The local police were simply inadequate to
cope with the rising totalitarian party.
It is interesting to note that Germany, with its
decentralized police, succumbed to totalitarianism,
while France, with a national police, did not. This
is not to suggest that the main reason for the
greater durability of French democracy over Ger-
man democracy was the existence of a more highly-
centralized police. Other, and more important
factors, were obviously at work in determining the
trend of events in those perilous days. However,
the difference in police systems may well have
played a role. To the extent that police power in-
fluenced the fortunes of the Weimar Republic, it
was its weakness rather than its strength which
contributed to the republic's demise.
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To sum up, a centralized police, far from posing
a threat to democracy, may actually serve as its
bulwark. In looking at other countries, we find an
increasing number of such centralized police
forces working effectively to maintain and extend
democratic government. This might well prompt
some re-examination of the situation in the United
States. A single national police force is probably
undesirable, or even unworkable, in a country of
this size and diversity. But the possibilities for
greatly increased state government participation in
the police function merit careful consideration.
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